

## On Panaetius' Conception of μεγαλοψυχία

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Panaetius of Rhodes, the main source of Cicero, *De officiis* 1–2 occupies an important place in Stoic reflection on μεγαλοψυχία. Whereas earlier Stoic thought had classed it as a minor virtue subordinate to ἀνδρεία (SVF 3, fr. 264–265, 269–270, 274–275), Panaetius elevated it to the rank of one of the four cardinal virtues<sup>1</sup> and thus helped to prepare the way for its prominence in Epictetus<sup>2</sup>. In spite of useful discussions of various aspects of the problem by Pohlenz<sup>3</sup>, Knoche<sup>4</sup>, Gauthier<sup>5</sup>, and Kirsche<sup>6</sup>, renewed examination of this surprising development may yet help to clarify 1. historical and systemic factors operative in the formation of Panaetius' view, 2. his relation to predecessors, notably Aristotle, and 3. the content of his treatment of μεγαλοψυχία in problematical cases or where there is reason to suspect Ciceronian alteration.

The migration of μεγαλοψυχία into the orbit of ἀνδρεία in the earlier Stoa might surprise readers of Aristotle. Although he speaks of the μεγαλόψυχος as one who runs great risks and, when he does so, takes no thought for his life (EN 1124 b 6–9), and as one who would never flee in a disorderly fashion (EN 1123 b 31), Aristotle does not bring μεγαλοψυχία into a particular relation to ἀνδρεία any more than to the other virtues, of all of which he says that it is the κόσμος (EN 1124 a 1). The explanation for the Stoic development is to be found in

1 Against the thesis of Maximilian Schäfer, *Ein frühmittelstoisches System der Ethik bei Cicero* (Diss. Munich 1934) 155, 332 et saepe, that this innovation was due to Antipater of Tarsus, cf. Ulrich Knoche, *Magnitudo Animi. Untersuchungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung eines römischen Wertgedankens*, *Philologus*, Suppl.-Bd. 27, Heft 3 (1935) 53, n. 229; cf. Heinz Gomoll, *Der stoische Philosoph Hecaton. Seine Begriffswelt und Nachwirkung unter Beigabe seiner Fragmente* (Diss. Bonn [publ. Borsdorf-Leipzig] 1933) 38–41: Hecaton (fr. 6 Gomoll) formalizes the relationship by classing ἀνδρεία as a nontheoretical virtue (and μεγαλοψυχία, presumably, as a theoretical one [cf. fr. 3 Gomoll]); cf. in general Helen F. North, *Canons and Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin Literature*, *The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan*, ed. Luitpold Wallach (Ithaca, N.Y. 1966) 165–183.

2 Cf. Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa. Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung* 1<sup>4</sup> (Göttingen 1970) 332, with passages cited in 2<sup>4</sup> (Göttingen 1972) 163 (on p. 332, l. 20).

3 Idem, *Antikes Führertum. Cicero de Officiis und das Lebensideal des Panaitios*, *Neue Wege zur Antike*, 2. Reihe, Heft 3 (1934) 40–55.

4 U. Knoche (n. 1 supra), esp. 45ff.

5 R.-A. Gauthier, *Magnanimité. L'idéal de la grandeur dans la philosophie païenne et dans la théologie chrétienne*, *Bibliothèque thomiste* 28 (Paris 1951), esp. 133–141, 157–160.

6 Hans-Gert Kirsche, *Megalopsychia. Beiträge zur griechischen Ethik im 4. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Diss. Göttingen 1952), esp. 58–61.

popular Greek usage. The semantic development from preparedness to sacrifice oneself for a noble cause (exemplified, e.g., in Aeschin. 1, 145 or Lycurg. Leocr. 100) to bravery in general (Aeschin. 3, 212, ironically of Demosthenes: ἀνὴρ μεγαλόψυχος καὶ τὰ πολεμικὰ διαφέρων<sup>7</sup>) is indeed an obvious one.

Panaetius is prepared to admit that, κατὰ περίστασιν, physical courage may be necessary (Off. 1, 81: *sed cum tempus necessitasque postulat, decertandum manu est et mors servituti turpitudinique anteponenda*; cf. Isocr. Ep. 2, 4); yet the fact that ἀνδρεία is now subsumed under μεγαλοψυχία, rather than vice versa, implies a shift of emphasis from physical to mental aspects. St. Ambrose's distinction between *fortitudo animi* and the fortitude displayed in war and deliberate emphasis on the former in the corresponding passage of his treatise *De officiis ministrorum*<sup>8</sup> is not alien to the spirit of the Panaetian reform. The altered emphasis is what might have been expected in the light of Panaetius' plan to construct his ethics on the basis of natural drives peculiar to man as distinct from animals (Off. 1, 11–14; cf. Off. 1, 81: *temere autem in acie versari et manu cum hoste configere immane quiddam et beluarum simile est*; on the fortitude of animals cf. also Off. 1, 50 and Pl. Legg. 963 e 4). Hence the stress laid on the key role of reason in making decisions in questions of war and peace (Off. 1, 79–81) and the deliberate emphasis on the importance of the statesman at the expense of the general (Off. 1, 74–78)<sup>9</sup>. The groundwork for this development was laid in Isocrates' second letter, in which he reminds Philip that the duties of the general or king differ from the bravery of the common soldier (Ep. 2, 2–12)<sup>10</sup>.

Yet if Panaetius has upgraded μεγαλοψυχία within the hierarchy of Stoic virtues, he has not restored it to the lofty pinnacle on which Aristotle had placed it as the κόσμος of all the virtues (EN 1124 a 1). The relation of μεγαλοψυχία to the other virtues is worked out in more detail at EE 1232 a 35–38 and 1232 b 23–25, where he conceives that each virtue has its own μεγαλόψυχοι. In Panaetius' ethical system, however, it is τὸ πρέπον which occupies the corresponding place by being an independent virtue alongside the others but yet pertaining to each of the other virtues individually (cf. Off. 1, 96) and by being characterized as an ornament (*ornatus vitae* Off. 1, 93)<sup>11</sup>. Indeed it is possible that in terms of its

7 Ibid. 38.

8 *De off. min.* 1, 175 and 192.

9 Admittedly, Cicero's personal stake in the argument is considerable, but in view of the Greek examples by which the argument is illustrated (*Off.* 1, 75–76) and its compatibility with the Panaetian doctrine of the role of reason in warfare (*Off.* 1, 79–81), one need not assume that Cicero has deviated from his source; a different position is taken, without detailed argumentation, by K. Büchner, Ass. Guillaume Budé, VII<sup>e</sup> Congrès (Aix-en-Provence, 1–6 avril 1963), Actes du Congrès (Paris 1964) 255–256.

10 Cf. Eduard Meyer, *Kleine Schriften* 2 (Halle a.d. Saale 1924) 110–111.

11 On Panaetius' πρέπον cf. most recently Hans Armin Gärtner, *Cicero und Panaitios. Beobachtungen zu De officiis*, Sber. Ak. Heidelberg, phil.-hist. Kl., Jg. 1974, 5. Abh. (Heidelberg 1974), esp. 54–56.

position in the hierarchy of virtues Panaetius' *πρέπον* is modelled on Aristotle's μεγαλοψυχία. However that may be, the fact remains that even within Panaetius' system μεγαλοψυχία has not fully regained its former glory. Why not?

It is remarkable in itself that the ideal of μεγαλοψυχία, with its aristocratic tincture<sup>12</sup>, was able to weather the storms of fourth century democratic Athens and still be invoked by orators of both the pro- and anti-Philip parties<sup>13</sup>. It was perhaps inevitable that the ideal itself would sooner or later come under attack, as it did in the pseudo-Platonic Alcibiades II, where Socrates warns the young Alcibiades against ambitious hopes of world conquest and classifies μεγαλοψυχία as the mildest name for folly (140 c and 150 c). Aristotle had listed Alcibiades among examples of μεγαλόψυχοι at An. Post. 97 b 18 and had characterized the young in general as μεγαλόψυχοι (Rhet. 1389 a 30). Hence the young Alcibiades is an apt instrument for attacking μεγαλοψυχία as such<sup>14</sup>. For maximum impact (and minimum risk) this work on the folly of ambitions for world conquest ought to have been composed after Alexander's death. But whatever the relation of the Alcibiades II to Alexander, the career of the Macedonian conqueror, as interpreted by philosophers beginning with Theophrastus<sup>15</sup>, could not but serve as a warning example of possibilities of abuse of power by would-be μεγαλόψυχοι. Panaetius' decision not to make μεγαλοψυχία the central virtue of his ethical system is surely connected with this new awareness<sup>16</sup>.

His heavy emphasis on the dangers and pitfalls inherent in this ideal is to be viewed in the same light. Aristotle's allusions to the character of the μεγαλόψυχος as αὐτάρκης (EN 1124 b 31f.; 1125 a 12) are not accompanied by any warning of possible dangers to society at large. He does specify, however, that the μεγαλόψυχος should possess all the virtues (EN 1124 a 1–3 and 20ff.); no doubt he regarded this prerequisite as sufficient guarantee against abuses. Panaetius similarly recognizes the *appetitio quaedam principatus* as the source of

12 Cf. Werner Jaeger, *Humanistische Reden und Vorträge*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin 1960) 191–194; U. Knoche (n. 1 supra) 15–17.

13 Cf. the evidence collected by Kirsche (n. 6 supra) 36ff.

14 A special definition for μεγαλόψυχος/-ία ('Quixotic/Quixotism' or the like: cf. W. R. Lamb's Loeb translation, *Plato*, 7 [London and New York 1927]; LSJ s.vv.; Kirsche [n. 6 supra] 34) is not needed in spite of the unusual company it keeps here (... μαινομένους ... ἡλιθίους ... ἐμβροντήτους ... κτλ. 140 c). Such an ad hoc definition blunts the edge of the attack here intended.

15 Cf. Johannes Stroux, *Die stoische Beurteilung Alexanders des Grossen*, *Philologus* 88, N.F. 42 (1933) 222–240; for Theophrastus in particular 233.

16 Note that Panaetius invokes Alexander as a negative example (*Off.* 1, 90; cf. A. Grilli, *Plutarco, Panezio e il giudizio su Alessandro magno*, *Acme* 5, 1952, 451–457; on Stroux's conjecture *tumidissimus* for *turpissimus* [n. 15 supra] 235–238, cf. M. Pohlenz [n. 3 supra] 54, n. 1); one wonders whether he appeared as such already in the treatise Περὶ μεγαλοψυχίας of Demetrius of Phalerum (fr. 78 Wehrli<sup>2</sup>).

*magnitudo animi* (Off. 1, 13). This becomes a problem for him, however, since he does not state that the μεγαλόψυχος should possess all the virtues: such a requirement might have detracted from his new overarching virtue, τὸ πρέπον. By way of compensation, however, he tries to bring μεγαλοψυχία into close relationship with δικαιοσύνη (Off. 1, 62–65, esp. 1, 62: *nihil honestum esse potest, quod iustitia vacat*) and lays stress on the dangers of *nimia cupiditas principatus*<sup>17</sup>.

In specifying the essential characteristics of the μεγαλόψυχος Panaetius combines endoxic and Stoic elements but little that is specifically Aristotelian. The first characteristic, *rerum externarum despicientia* (Off. 1, 66), presupposes the Stoic valuation of external goods and hence differs from Aristotle's formulation: περὶ πλοῦτον καὶ δυναστείαν καὶ πᾶσαν εὐτυχίαν καὶ ἀτυχίαν μετρίως ἔξει (EN 1124 a 13–15). However, the attitude of “despising”, whether other persons (EN 1124 a 29ff.) or their false opinions (EE 1232 a 38–b 10), is characteristic of the Aristotelian μεγαλόψυχος (cf. EE 1232 b 9–10: καὶ τὸ ὀλίγων τοῦ μεγαλοψύχου μάλιστ' εἶναι πάθος ἴδιον<sup>18</sup>); hence Aristo of Ceus, Lycon's successor as head of the Peripatos, felt the need for a firmly drawn distinction between μεγαλοψυχία and ὑπερηφάνια (fr. 13: p. 35, 23–27 Wehrli). For Panaetius the *rerum externarum despicientia* rests upon two convictions: 1. ... *nihil hominem nisi quod honestum decorumque sit aut admirari aut optare aut expetere oportere* ...: though the Stoic view of external goods is the implicit basis, at least the topos of *nil admirari* as applied to the μεγαλόψυχος occurs in Aristotle as well (EN 1125 a 2–3); 2. ... *nullique neque homini neque perturbationi animi nec fortunae succumbere*: the Aristotelian passages illustrating the drive of the μεγαλόψυχος for independence from other men are cited in the preceding paragraph; the application of the ideal of ἀπάθεια to the μεγαλόψυχος is, of course, specifically Stoic<sup>19</sup>; the ability of the μεγαλόψυχος to surmount misfortune is a conception predating Aristotle (Democr. 68 B 46 Diels-Kranz: μεγαλοψυχίη τὸ φέρειν πραέως πλημμέλειαν) but one which Aristotle adopted (An. Post. 97 b 21–22; EN 1100 b 30–33); the ability to bear good or evil fortune then becomes the essence of the definition of μεγαλοψυχία not only in the Peripatos (Ps. Arist. De virtutibus et vitiis 1250 a 14–15 and 1250 b 34ff.), but also in the Academy (Ps. Pl. Def. 412 a 9) and the Stoa (SVF 3, fr. 264–265. 269–270. 274–

17 Off. 1, 62–65. 68 (cf. also Off. 1, 84): though the relevance of such warnings to Roman politics of 44 B.C. is unmistakable, the citation of Plato (*Menex.* 246 e; *Lach.* 197 b) at Off. 1, 63 guarantees the Panaetian provenance of the doctrine; cf. also the citation of Plato at Off. 1, 64 and the allusion to Aesch. *Sept.* 592 at Off. 1, 65. For a different view of the provenance of Off. 1, 64 cf. Büchner (n. 9 supra) 255–256.

18 Note, however, that the form of expression itself (δοκεῖ is understood from the preceding sentence) betrays the status of this observation as an ἐνδοξον; cf. also the δοκεῖ at EE 1232 a 38.

19 However, Panaetius gives a new content to ἀπάθεια, for which he prefers the Epicurean term ἀταραξία: cf. Pohlenz (n. 3 supra) 44–45.

275). The second characteristic of the Panaetian μεγαλόψυχος, of which the first, just named is said to be the *causa ... efficiens* (Off. 1, 67), is the performance of great and difficult deeds (Off. 1, 66). This feature, too, can be paralleled from Aristotle (Rhet. 1366 b 17: μεγαλοψυχία δὲ ἀρετὴ μεγάλων ποιητικὴ εὐεργετημάτων ...), where, however, its character is more endoxic than philosophical.

Thus, in spite of his epithet φιλαριστοτέλης (fr. 57 van Straaten<sup>3</sup>; cf. fr. 55), Panaetius has omitted the specifically Aristotelian features of μεγαλοψυχία such as its position as a mean between two extremes and the definition of the μεγαλόψυχος as ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν (EN 1123 b 2; cf. EE 1232 b 27–31), and included little that is recognizably Aristotelian. Indeed, he is thoroughly Stoic in his view of the external goods, his recognition of ἀπάθεια as a goal, and his consequent polemic against the Peripatetic attitude toward anger (Off. 1, 88–89). Further points of agreement between Aristotle and Panaetius are less than striking: both insist that the μεγαλόψυχος should be truthful (EN 1124 b 30, but with an interesting exception: ... πλὴν ὅσα μὴ δι' εἰρωνείαν πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς [cp. Socrates as an example of μεγαλοψυχία at An. Post. 97 b 211]; Off. 1, 63); both arrive at similar formulas governing the behavior of μεγαλόψυχοι toward others<sup>20</sup>; just as Aristotle's μεγαλόψυχος is μεγαλοκίνδυνος (EN 1124 b 8), so Panaetius assumes that the μεγαλόψυχος will have to run risks but, as in his treatment of physical courage, he chooses to emphasize the rational calculation that precedes risk-taking: ... *sed fugiendum illud etiam, ne offeramus nos periculis sine causa, quo esse nihil potest stultius* (Off. 1, 83)<sup>21</sup>. Similar reservations apply to the Aristotelian features of Panaetius' treatment of glory: *vera autem et sapiens animi magnitudo honestum illud, quod maxime natura sequitur, in factis positum, non in gloria iudicat principemque se esse mavult quam videri. etenim qui ex errore imperitae multitudinis pendet, hic in magnis viris non est habendus. facillime autem ad res iniustas impellitur, ut quisque altissimo animo est, gloriae cupiditate; qui locus est sane lubricus, quod vix invenitur, qui laboribus susceptis periculisque aditis non quasi mercedem rerum gestarum desideret gloriam* (Off. 1, 65). This passage falls into two parts, one on a theoretical level, in which a certain type of behavior is postulated of the μεγαλόψυχος, the other on an empirical level. To bring the two levels into agreement is indeed a "locus lubricus". Note that the theoretical postulate that the μεγαλόψυχος should not depend upon the *error imperitae multitudinis* is in line with Aristotle's position (cf. esp. EE 1232 b 4–7: μεγαλοψύχου δὲ δοκεῖ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ περιὸν ὀλίγα σπουδάζειν, καὶ ταῦτα μεγάλα, καὶ οὐχ ὅτι δοκεῖ ἑτέρω τινί, καὶ μᾶλλον ἂν φροντίσειεν ἀνήρ μεγαλόψυχος, τί δοκεῖ ἐνὶ σπουδαίῳ ἢ

20 EN 1124 b 18–20 ... καὶ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον ...; Off. 1, 90 ... *ut recte praecipere videantur, qui monent, ut, quanto superiores simus, tanto nos geramus summissius.*

21 Cf. Kirsche (n. 6 supra) 59.

πολλοῖς τοῖς τυγχάνουσιν ...; cf. also EN 1124 a 6–7 and 1125 a 6–7); this may, however, be a case of both Aristotle and Panaetius adopting a Platonic stance (cf. Symp. 194 b 6). Might the empirical observations, in which the strict requirements for employment of the term μεγαλόψυχος just worked out are abandoned, be, at least in this form, Cicero's own contribution?<sup>22</sup> Thus, on the whole, in his treatment of μεγαλοψυχία Panaetius seems to be more φιλοπλάτων (fr. 57 van Straaten<sup>3</sup>) than φιλαριστοτέλης, since quotations from Plato provide major support for the argument against *cupiditas principatus* (Off. 1, 63–64) as well as for the precepts for statesmen (Off. 1, 85–87)<sup>23</sup>.

Panaetius distinguished sharply between two types of μεγαλόψυχοι, the representatives of the βίος θεωρητικός and of the βίος πολιτικός. A problem arises in reconstructing his doctrine of a third group of μεγαλόψυχοι, since seemingly contradictory accounts of them are offered at Off. 1, 71 and 1, 92: at Off. 1, 71 we are told that some persons may be exempted from public service if they are hindered by health or some other serious cause; at 1, 92, on the other hand, the third group of μεγαλόψυχοι must meet certain criteria with respect to their means for acquiring and using their estates, but no reference is made to the previous discussion or to ill-health or the like as a prerequisite. In fact these two sets of qualifications, one negative and one positive, are not mutually exclusive and are both likely to be Panaetian. The negative requirement (... *qui aut valitudinis imbecillitate aut aliqua graviore causa impediti* ... Off. 1, 71) corresponds to Chrysippus' doctrine that the wise man should engage in public affairs ἄν μή τι κωλύη (SVF 3, fr. 697; cf. 690)<sup>24</sup>. Therefore it is likely to be a Panaetian borrowing from his predecessor. However, such a person, though exempt from the βίος πολιτικός would not yet qualify for the title μεγαλόψυχος. Hence the positive requirements at Off. 1, 92 which accord well with Panaetius' ethical system as represented elsewhere in Off. 1–2. The estate of the third type of μεγαλόψυχος is to have been acquired justly, *neque turpi quaestu neque odioso*. We have already noted Panaetius' insistence upon justice as a sine qua non for μεγαλοψυχία (Off. 1, 62); the matter of acquiring wealth by the proper means was so important for

22 In his discussion of this passage, A. D. Leeman, *Gloria. Cicero's Waardering van de Roem en haar Achtergrond in de Hellenistische Wijsbegeerte en de Romeinse Samenleving* (Diss. Leiden [printed Rotterdam] 1949) 37, perhaps does not distinguish sufficiently clearly between Aristotle's discussion of τιμή, which he translates 'roem', and *gloria* (presumably Panaetian δόξα), also translated as 'roem': δόξα is, of course, merely one possible manifestation of τιμή.

23 Though I have preferred not to rule out the possibility a priori (on the present status quaestionis of the fate of Aristotle's library cf. Paul Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen* 1, Peripatoi 5 [Berlin/New York 1973] 3–31), none of the evidence here examined compels one to assume that Panaetius made direct use of Aristotle's ethical πραγματεῖαι. It is possible that some Aristotelian views on the subject could have been transmitted to Panaetius via the treatise Περὶ μεγαλοψυχίας by Demetrius of Phalerum (fr. 78 Wehrli<sup>2</sup>).

24 Cited already in connection with Off. 1, 71 by M. Pohlenz (n. 3 supra) 47. In specifying ill health as a possible cause Cicero may have in mind his friend Marcus Marius (*Adfam.* 7, 1–4; cf. Münzer, RE 14, 2 [1930] 1819–20).



Panaetius that he concluded his discussion of τὸ πρέπον with a list of permissible and impermissible professions (Off. 1, 150–151)<sup>25</sup>. Likewise the estate is to be increased by *ratio* and *diligentia* and is to serve *liberalitas* and *beneficentia* (which comprise the second part of Panaetius' second cardinal virtue, that of man in society, Off. 1, 20), rather than the selfish ends of *libido* and *luxuria*. Furthermore it is to be shared with relatives, friends, and the state, the three principal claimants on one's *beneficia* according to Off. 1, 58<sup>26</sup>. The tendency of these criteria to redirect behavior away from self-serving ends toward socially valuable ones is in line with Panaetius' treatment of μεγαλοψυχία in general (cf. Off. 1, 62–66). The complementary rather than contradictory nature of these two sets of criteria for the third group of μεγαλόψυχοι is obscured, however, by the fact that they are introduced in isolation from each other and by the lack of any cross-reference between the two passages. Possibly this state of affairs may be the result of the haste with which Cicero composed Off.<sup>27</sup>

Panaetius illustrated his doctrines with copious historical examples (cf. Cicero's complaint at Off. 2, 16). I should like to suggest that just as at Off. 2, 16 so too in the treatment of μεγαλοψυχία Cicero may have curtailed the number of these examples<sup>28</sup>. In particular the figure of Demosthenes seems likely to have been scrutinized as a candidate for the title μεγαλόψυχος. In fact, a verdict by Panaetius on Demosthenes' statesmanship is quoted by Plutarch, Dem. 13, 4

25 Cf. Xen. *Oec.* 4, 2; Ar. *EN* 1121 b 32; Poll. 6, 128; Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* 2 (Berlin 1932) 396, n. 1; P. M. Schuhl, *Gains honorables et gains sordides selon Cicéron*, *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 82 (1957) 355–357; P. A. Brunt, *Dio Chrysostom and Stoic Social Thought*, *Proc. Cambridge Philol. Soc.* 199, n.s. 19 (1973) 26–34.

26 Cf. *The Composition and Sources of Cicero, De off. 1, 50–58*, *Calif. Stud. Class. Ant.* 12 (1979).

27 On hasty composition of *Off.* cf. *Att.* 15, 13, 6 and 16, 11, 4; Siegfried Häfner, *Die literarischen Pläne Ciceros* (Diss. Munich [publ. Coburg] 1928) 13; Gunnar Rudberg, *Ein Cicero-Konzept. Zu De Officiis I*, *Symb. Osl.* 9 (1930) 4–6; M. Fiévez, 'Opera peregrinationis huius' ou les étapes de la composition du *De officiis*, *Latomus* 12 (1953) 261–274; Matthias Gelzer, *Cicero. Ein biographischer Versuch* (Wiesbaden 1969) 357; for another problem in *Off.*

been caused by the editorial carelessness of a hasty Cicero cf. loc. cit. in the preceding note; Klaus Bernd Thomas, *Textkritische Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Schrift De Officiis*, *Orbis Antiquus* 26 (Münster Westf. 1971) passim, invokes hasty composition and lack of the summa manus to explain various peculiarities of the style and train of thought of the transmitted text of *Off.*.

Cf. also Reimar Müller, *ΒΙΟΣ ΘΕΩΡΗΤΙΚΟΣ bei Antiochos von Askalon und Cicero*, *Helikon* 8 (1968) 223 with literature cited in n. 3. E. de Saint-Denis, *La théorie cicéronienne de la participation aux affaires publiques*, *Rev. Phil. Litt. et Hist. Anc.* 12 (1938) 194–195 and 211–214 finds Cicero's attitude in *Off.* liberal by comparison with the earlier stance of *Rep.* 1, 1–12 and accounts for the change in terms of the altered political climate of 44 as compared with 54; if, however, as Saint-Denis believes, *Rep.* 1, 1–12 is independent of Panaetius (cf. n. 31 infra), it should be considered whether the differences observed might be due in part to Panaetian influence on *Off.*

28 A case is made for curtailment of other Panaetian material in the treatment of μεγαλοψυχία at *Am. Journ. Phil.* 100 (1979) 408–416.

(= fr. 94 van Straaten<sup>3</sup>). This passage has long been assigned to the Περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος<sup>29</sup>. There is warrant for placing it in the section on μεγαλοψυχία in particular, since the quality of certain Demosthenic speeches which is singled out for praise is the attitude that τὸ καλόν is to be chosen for its own sake<sup>30</sup>, the characteristic attitude of the μεγαλόψυχος according to Off. 1, 66. If this hypothesis is correct, it implies that Panaetius established a hierarchy of Athenian statesmen in the course of his discussion of μεγαλοψυχία, since the fragment in question distinguishes two groups: mediocre statesmen such as Moerocles, Polyzelus, Hyperides (and Demosthenes) and superior statesmen, including Cimon, Thucydides, and Pericles. Indeed, it is unlikely in itself that Panaetius' evaluation of statesmen broke off after he had discussed merely the fathers of the classical Athenian and Spartan constitutions, Solon and Lycurgus<sup>31</sup>. Now there is still more reason for supposing that Cicero's *exempla Romana* have supplanted Panaetian examples drawn from Greek history at Off. 1, 76–78<sup>32</sup>.

In view of the fact that Plutarch cites his sources by name only sporadical-

29 So already Fridericus Gebhard, *De Plutarchi in Demosthenis vita fontibus ac fide* (Diss. Munich 1880) 32, n. 1 and *Plutarch's Life of Demosthenes*, ed. H. A. Holden (Cambridge 1893), ad loc. There is attested a Panaetian work Περὶ Σωκράτους (fr. 50 = 132 van Straaten<sup>3</sup>); there is also evidence for philological interest of Panaetius in the text of Plato and other Socratics (ibid., frs. 123, 124, 126–130). Though the attempt of August Schmekel, *Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa* (Berlin 1892) 231–236, to combine these into a single biographical-critical work on Socrates and the Socratics is not particularly plausible in itself, still less so is his attribution of our fragment to that hypothetical work. The attribution rests upon three assumptions: 1. that Panaetius regarded Demosthenes as a pupil of Plato; 2. that Plutarch derived the Panaetian material in all his lives from a single work; 3. that in view of the express citation of the Περὶ Σωκράτους in fr. 132 (= Aristid. 27, 4) that one work is the treatise on Socrates and the Socratics. As for 1., we simply have no evidence on this point; the fact that Panaetius attributed to some Demosthenic speeches the view that the καλόν is to be chosen for its own sake can hardly be taken as such evidence (Demosthenes need not have studied with Plato to have held that view). As for 2.–3., the “Einquellenprinzip” of source-analysis has long since ceased to command credibility; the assignment of fragments must be based on their individual content, not on aprioristic grounds. Schmekel's attribution, then, is founded upon too many weak, dubious, and unsupported assumptions to be considered structurally sound. Engelbert Drerup, *Demosthenes im Urteile des Altertums*, Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums, 12. Bd., H. 1–2 (Würzburg 1923) 103, n. 1, wavers between Gebhard's position and Schmekel's. Van Straaten's placement of our fragment in a section with the heading ‘De cognitione’ was unfortunate.

30 A little later it is τὸ καλόν and τὸ πρέπον, but a passage the point of which resides in the evaluation of Demosthenes' statesmanship is unlikely to have been drawn from Panaetius' discussion of τὸ πρέπον.

31 Cf. *Rep.* 1, 12 *neque enim est ulla res in qua propius ad deorum numen virtus accedat humana, quam civitatis aut condere novas aut conservare iam conditas*. Whether or not as argued by M. Pohlenz (n. 3 supra) 46–47 with 47, n. 1, *Rep.* 1, 1–12 should be assigned to Panaetius (cf. contra E. Saint-Denis [n. 27 supra]), it seems only natural that some discussion of *conservatores* should follow upon that of *conditores*.

32 Note also the negative examples provided by Callicratidas and Cleombrotus at *Off.* 1, 84.



ly<sup>33</sup>, it is possible that in other passages in his Demosthenes we have material drawn from Panaetius. For instance, at Dem. 20, 1 in approving Demosthenes' defiance of the oracle, is Plutarch perhaps putting on a cloak of Panaetian rationalism<sup>34</sup> quite unlike his normal veneration for Delphi, a veneration bred of local patriotism and personal involvement in the cult? Note also how well this praise of the use of λογισμοί squares with the Panaetian doctrine of Off. 1, 80–81. In addition, several qualities singled out in the discussion of Demosthenes' imitation of Pericles and attitude toward extemporaneous speaking (Dem. 9, 3) are reminiscent of the Panaetian μεγαλόψυχος: the preference for deliberation over speed (Off. 1, 80–82; cf. also the slow gate of the Aristotelian μεγαλόψυχος EN 1125 a 12–13); the unwillingness to make his faculty dependent on fortune (cf. Off. 1, 66). Possibly, then, Panaetius may have weighed various μεγαλόψυχος-like traits of Demosthenes before finally denying him the highest rank among statesmen<sup>35</sup>.

Thus, the ideal of μεγαλοψυχία showed remarkable vitality in surviving the disintegration of the “Adelsethik” in which it originally had its place. Aristotle thought it worthwhile to receive it into his ethical system in spite of the obvious difficulties it posed. He had to fill it with a moral content which it doubtless often lacked in actual usage and had to admit that in one sense it is an extreme rather than a mean (EN 1123 b 13–14). Panaetius' revival of μεγαλοψυχία after its eclipse by ἀνδρεία in the earlier Stoa was no less a philosophical act of will. To be sure, the replacement of ἀνδρεία by μεγαλοψυχία secured him the advantage of intellectualizing the third cardinal virtue in accordance with his conception of the virtues as based on drives peculiar to man. Yet he was well aware that he was upgrading μεγαλοψυχία at some risk to the *communitas ac societas vitae*, by which he set great store. Hence the warnings and restrictions with which he felt it necessary to hedge in the μεγαλόψυχος. The content with which he filled his ideal is not so much specifically Aristotelian as endoxic, Stoic, and Platonic. Its inspiration was not Alexander and his successors, but, if our reconstruction is correct, the great figures of classical Greek (especially Athenian) history. It will probably not be possible to reconstruct the complete train of thought and argumentation of Panaetius' treatment of μεγαλοψυχία<sup>36</sup>. The foregoing is offered merely as a contribution to understanding the historical position, sources, and nature of Panaetius' conception<sup>37</sup>.

33 Cf. K. Ziegler, RE 21, 1 (1951) 911, 65ff.

34 Wilamowitz, *Reden und Vorträge* 2<sup>4</sup> (Berlin 1926) 201, speaks of Panaetius' “konsequenter Rationalismus”; cf. also 190 and 199 and eund. (n. 25 supra), 395 and 398.

35 Note that Panaetius implicitly accepts the view of Demetrius of Phalerum (fr. 133 Wehrli<sup>2</sup> = Plut. *Dem.* 14, 2) that Demosthenes was cowardly and venal (cf. Drerup [n. 29 supra] 103–104); hence his refusal to admit him to the company of Pericles et al.

36 M. Pohlenz (n. 3 supra) 48 offers further suggestions.

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